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The first chapter of the Federalist Society was founded at Yale Law School in 1980, and the following year, a second chapter began at the University of Chicago Law School (Bossert 1997; Hicks 2006) . By 1982, the Federalist Society was legally established as a non-profit corporation and thereafter became a national organization (McIntosh 2003) . From its inception, the Federalist Society sought to provide a counterbalance to the "liberal jurisprudence" that prevailed in the nation's law schools at that time, most notably by developing a method of constitutional interpretation now known as textualism (alternatively referred to as originalism).
As the Society's Executive Director, Eugene Meyer, explains textualism:
If a word meant "x" when the Constitution was passed, and it means "y" today...you presumably want to stick with the meaning it had before. But for the most part, (Meyer 2002) .
The Society has also long focused attention on the proper role of federal court judges in our democracy. They contend that judges should practice "judicial restraint;" unelected jurists should not interject their personal policy preferences when interpreting the Constitution:
Is the court interpreting the text and meaning of the Constitution? If it is, and they [the judges or justices] are doing the best they can do...their judgment might be off, but there is not a structural problem. If the court is saying, 'gee, we don't like the direction policy is going in this country [and w] e want to change the direction of policy...that is not a proper role for the courts (Meyer 2002) .
It has also been part of the Federalist Society's central mission "to encourage people to listen to these views [about textualism] more attentively, and, perhaps ultimately, to question some of the liberal positions which are being presented as the law" (Scaife Foundation Grant Proposal 1982) . In short, the Society made plain as early as 1982 that it hopes to "transition" nonbelievers -lawyers who support the method of constitutional interpretation that sees the document as "living" and "evolving" -into committed supporters of originalism (Teles 2008) .
Because the Society's positions on both constitutional interpretation and the role of unelected judges were deemed as viable legal arguments to further conservative political policy goals, the Society soon found itself important allies in Republican presidential administrations.
Society Members Gain Influential Positions in the Executive and Judicial Branches
The association between the Federalist Society and the Executive Branch began during the Reagan administration when Michael Horowitz, Reagan's Director of the Office of Management and Budget, contacted the Society's founding members and began introducing them to key people in the Reagan administration (Teles 2008) . Edwin Meese -Counselor to the President and Attorney General (1985-88) -was another early supporter of the organization (Shapiro 1998; Teles 2008) . Meese also urged all lawyers at Justice to become affiliated with the Federalist Society (Landay 2000) . To this end, in 1985, the Federalist Society created its lawyers' division for practicing attorneys, law professors and judges. Meese then began elevating Federalist Society members to positions of importance in the Reagan Justice Department. By 1986, all 12 of the Assistant Attorneys General in the Justice Department were tied to the Federalist Society (Lewis 1991 (Miner 1992) . This period thus saw a second Society member appointed to the Supreme Court (Clarence Thomas) and eight more members nominated to the courts of appeals (though three were not confirmed). Set forth in 1 Given that the lawyers division of the Society was not started until 1985, and had few chapters in the mid-1980s, practicing attorneys could not formally become members of the Society during most of the Reagan administration. Instead, during this early period in the Society's history, Justice Department officials and judges were characterized as "friends of" or "sympathetic to" the organization by virtue of speaking at one of the student chapters' symposia (Carter 2001 After Clinton was elected in 1992, the Federalist Society became a "Justice Department in exile" (Neas, quoted in Bossert 1997) . However, during this period, Society members continued to network, and young lawyers affiliated with the Society were awarded prominent clerkships with conservative federal judges also affiliated with the Society (Bossert 1997 Table 1 ).
Liberal Interest Groups Accuse the Federalist Society of a Right Wing Cabal
Notwithstanding the significant influence the Society and its members have wielded in three straight Republican administrations in terms of staffing the Justice Department, the West Wing and the federal bench, the organization has always maintained that it is a non-political organization. Thus, for example, the Society has made a point of refraining qua organization from taking public stands on particular legal cases or endorsing the appointment of specific people to the bench (Bossert 1997) . But, liberal activists counter, the Society nonetheless seeks to influence legal decisions through a different method than that traditionally followed by interest groups: by encouraging Republican lawyers to join the organization; indoctrinating them to adopt the Society's conservative method of constitutional interpretation known as textualism; and then seeing that Federalist Society members are strategically placed in positions of influence in the Justice Department and on the federal bench.
In support of their argument, liberal activists are quick to point to a document prepared by Society affiliates serving in the Reagan Justice Department (Cavendish 2002; Gandy 2002; Neas 2002) . 6 Specifically, in 1988, the Reagan Justice Department issued the Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation (the "Guidelines"). The Guidelines were intended to act as a roadmap for U.S. Attorneys litigating cases in federal district courts (Guidelines 1988, 1). The Guidelines were not mere suggestions, but instead, "should presumptively be followed" (Guidelines 1988, 1).
As a primary tenet of constitutional interpretation, the Guidelines instructed U.S. Attorneys to advance, whenever possible, constitutional arguments using textualist interpretations of the Constitution. Prosecutors' primary duty at this stage of the litigation was to "educate" lower court judges on the theory of textualism and to lay the groundwork for strong appellate arguments (Guidelines 1988, 3) . The Guidelines also set forth specific areas of law for which these textualist arguments were most relevant, including cases involving civil liberties for criminal defendants, federalism, civil rights for minorities and privacy rights. To this end, the Guidelines specifically instructed prosecutors to argue in legal briefs for the reversal of some of the Supreme Court's most seminal decisions of the 20 th century, including Roe v. Wade, Miranda v. Arizona and Wickard v. Filburn (Guidelines, 54, 82, 86) . 7 Roe held that the 14 th Amendment's Due Process Clause encompasses a substantive right to privacy, and that includes a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy. Miranda held that the Fifth Amendment's ban on selfincrimination -together with the Sixth Amendment's requirement that all indigent criminal defendants be afforded appointed counsel -requires that the police inform people of these rights before interrogating them. Wickard held that a congressional statute -which prohibited individuals from growing wheat for personal consumption -was sufficiently related to interstate commerce so that it may be regulated by the federal government. 8 Current Supreme Court justice Samuel Alito, also a Society member, was on the Third Circuit panel that heard Casey; Alito voted to uphold Pennsylvania's restrictive abortion statute in toto.
think, already accomplished an enormous amount of what they wanted to do and it has gone completely under the radar (Gandy 2002 ).
Other liberal activists concur, and fear that, ultimately, the Society will gain enough clout to put constitutional interpretation "back where it was before 1937" (Neas 2002) . Others worry specifically about the future of civil rights laws passed in the 1960s (Gandy 2002; see also Aron 2002; Cavendish 2002) . 9 In short, liberal activists believe that the Society is seeking to "accomplish in the courts what Republicans can't achieve politically" (Gandy 2002; Neas 2002) - that is, to overturn progressive Supreme Court precedent and congressional legislation through the appointment of extremely conservative federal court judges.
Hypothesis, Data and Methods
We now subject to empirical analysis the claim that Federalist Society members sitting on the federal bench are more conservative than other jurists, including other Republican jurists:
H1: Judges who are affiliated with the Federalist Society are more conservative in their judicial decisionmaking behavior than judges who are not affiliated with the Federalist Society.
We test this hypothesis using data on decisionmaking behavior of judges who sit on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. As the level of the federal judicial hierarchy with the most Federalist Society members, data on decisionmaking in the courts of appeals provides the best opportunity to test our hypothesis.
We focus on two separate legal issues to test our hypothesis, one criminal and one civil: (1) does a search alleged to be illegal under the Fourth Amendment require that incriminating evidence be suppressed at trial; and (2) should a congressional statute be declared unconstitutional because Congress has overstepped its authority to the detriment of a state's sovereignty in violation of the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments? These issues were chosen for two critical reasons. First, while one of these issues, states' rights, is inextricably intertwined with the Society's core mission, the other, law and order, has been an issue embraced by the Republican Party (including Republican judges) since the Nixon administration (Scherer 2005) . Second, both legal issues present a judge with clear choices between liberal and conservative outcomes. In search and seizure cases, the judge must either suppress evidence that incriminates the defendant so as to safeguard core constitutional rights (the liberal position) or deny defendant's claim of a constitutional violation to maintain "law and order" (the conservative position). In the states' rights area, the judge must choose between curtailing the power of the federal government (the conservative position) and expanding it (the liberal position).
The unit of analysis is each judge's vote (not the ultimate holding of the case), rendered on a three-judge or en banc appellate panel in all cases meeting certain criteria set out below. 10 The cases included in this study are the entire universe of "non-consensual" decisions (defined below) The analysis focuses specifically on "non-consensual" decisions rendered by the courts of appeals in the relevant time frame. In order to be considered a "non-consensual" decision, one of two conditions must be met: (1) the appellate panel -be it a regular panel or an en banc panelrendered a split decision (i.e., there was at least one dissenting vote against the majority ruling);
or (2) the appellate panel, though unanimous in its own decisions, reversed or vacated the decision of the District Court judge below.
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We identified the cases comprising these two data sets from a series of comprehensive searches on the electronic database WESTLAW. Included in the data are decisions officially designated by the court for publication in the Federal Reporter, as well as decisions not designated by the court for official publication but reprinted in full on the WESTLAW database.
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11 Although the cases analyzed contained votes of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter, we excluded these votes because these appointments were made before the Federalist Society was founded. We exclude the votes of Reagan appointees because, as explained above (see note 1, membership opportunities in the Society for practicing attorneys during the Reagan administration were very limited.
We constructed two models (one for each data set), employing a number of control variables in addition to the major explanatory variable, Federalist Society membership.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable in the states' rights data set is the vote of each individual judge either agreeing or disagreeing with the plaintiff that the state government's rights prevail over the federal government's rights. In the Tenth Amendment cases, this would mean a vote agreeing or disagreeing with the states' rights advocate that the federal government has exceeded its power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. In the Eleventh Amendment cases, this would mean a vote agreeing or disagreeing with the state that it is immune from suit, and that the federal government has not properly abrogated state sovereign immunity in the challenged congressional statute. Collectively, these two categories of cases are referred to throughout as "states' rights"
cases.
The dependent variable in the search and seizure data set is the vote of each individual judge either agreeing or disagreeing with the criminal defendant that, by virtue of the government's violation of his or her Fourth Amendment rights, incriminating evidence of the defendant's guilt must be suppressed at trial.
Independent Variables Federalist Society Membership
Because the Federalist Society is a loose confederation of law students, lawyers and judges, it is difficult to pin down precisely who on the federal bench is officially a dues-paying "member" of the Society as opposed to someone merely affiliated with the organization and its policy stances (Peterson 2005 Questionnaires are available to the public for all nominees from 1989 to the present.
The problem with this very narrow definition of Federalist Society member is that, identified as impacting judicial decisionmaking behavior (e.g., Segal 1983 Segal , 1986 ). These include place of the search, presence of a warrant, extent of the search (limited search such as a patdown versus a full-blown search) and whether the search took place at an international border.
14 In both models, we also control for variables related to the judge's background including political ideology, race, gender, circuit and whether the judge has taken senior status. We detail the coding of all independent variables in Web Appendix A.
14 Inter-coder reliability tests were performed on ten percent of the observations in the two data sets. The kappa statistics ranged from .9 to 1 in the states' rights data set, and .7 to 1 in the search and seizure data; both ranges indicate a substantial level of agreement in the coding (Landis and Koch 1977; Spriggs and Hansford 2000) .
Results
Both models are estimated using logit, as our dependent variables are measured dichotomously. Because some judges in the data sets vote multiple times, our models use robust standard errors to correct for potential heteroskedasticity and also cluster around each judge in order to account for possible non-independence between observations. 15 Although dummy variables for each circuit were included in the models, we do not report these coefficients in the tables. The Seventh Circuit was used as the baseline circuit in the model because it is generally deemed neither a particularly liberal nor conservative circuit. position when a greater number of amici briefs are filed on behalf of the federal government.
In order to facilitate interpretation of the logit coefficients we have calculated predicted probabilities of votes in favor of the states' right litigant. We assume the following conditions: a 15 In the states' rights model, there were a total of 86 judges contributing votes. The number of votes per judge ranged from one to eight; the median number of votes per judge was two. In the search and seizure model, there were a total of 120 judges contributing votes. The number of votes per judge ranged from one to 26; the median number was five.
white male judge in active service; deciding a Tenth Amendment case; with the same number of amici briefs filed on the pro-and anti-federal rights sides; and involving a federal statute that has moderate ideological distance from Congress. We present the pro-states' rights vote by appointing president, ideology and Federalist Society membership. These post-estimation probabilities are depicted in Figure 1 .
[
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
From Figure 1 we can see that the most liberal Clinton appointee has a 0.25 probably of voting for the state's rights position; the median Clinton appointee a .037 probability and the most conservative Clinton appointee a 0.48 probability. For Bush (41) appointees who are not Federalist Society members, the most liberal of this cohort has a 0.52 probability of voting for the conservative position, the median a 0.70 probability and the most conservative a 0.75 probability.
For Bush (43) judges who are not members of the Federalist Society, the most liberal of this cohort has a 0.59 probability of voting for the states' rights position, the median judge a 0.66 probability and the most conservative a 0.73 probability. Even Republican appointees not affiliated with the Society stand solidly to the right of Democratic appointees on the ideological spectrum when deciding states' rights issues.
For Federalist Society members, there is an even higher probability that the judge will support a textualist interpretation of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. In the Bush (41) administration, for a judge who is deemed less conservative by traditional judicial ideology measures, membership in the Society raises the probability of casting a conservative states' rights vote from 0 52 to 0.88 (a difference of 0.36); for a judge whose ideology score places him at the 16 Throughout the paper, we use the α = .05 level to conclude statistical significance (one-tailed test). Results for Society members appointed by Bush (43) are very similar to those for Bush (41) appointees. For the Bush (43) With respect to the search and seizure cases we ran two separate models, one using our broad definition of Federalist Society member (identified through questionnaires and newspaper articles) and one the narrower definition (questionnaires only). Because there was no substantive difference between the results of the two models, we present only the results of the model using the broader definition of Federalist Society membership.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Like the states' rights model, we again find the coefficient for Federalist Society membership is statistically significant. As hypothesized, Society members are more likely to uphold the government's search as consistent with the Fourth Amendment (the conservative position) than a non-member. We also find that black judges are less likely than white judges to rule in favor of the government when a search is challenged in court. Moreover, although slightly above the p = 0.05 level of statistical significance (one-tailed test), searches made with a warrant are more likely to be upheld than warrantless searches.
As we did with the states' rights model, we also calculated the predicted probability of a conservative search and seizure vote to facilitate interpretation of the logit coefficients. We assume a full-blown search of a home without a warrant; and decided by a white male judge still in active service. These post-estimation probabilities are depicted in Figure 2 .
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
As illustrated in Figure 2 , the most liberal Clinton appointee has a 0.31 probability of voting against a criminal defendant in a search and seizure case, the ideologically moderate Clinton appointee a 0.34 probability and the most conservative a 0.37 probability. For the most liberal
Bush (41) appointee who is not a member of the Federalist Society, there is 0.38 probability of a vote against a defendant, a 0.42 probability for a judge who lies in the middle of the ideological spectrum for this presidential cohort and a 0.44 probability for the most conservative among this cohort. For non-member Bush (43) appointees, the most liberal of the cohort has a 0.40 probability of casting a conservative criminal decision, the median judge a 0.41 probability and the most conservative a 0.43 probability.
More importantly, across the board, Federalist Society membership substantially increases the likelihood that a Republican judge will vote against a criminal defendant on a suppression motion turning on the Fourth Amendment. In the Bush (41) 
Why is the Society Influencing Decisionmaking?
Without question, our results demonstrate that Federalist Society membership has a statistically significant and substantively large impact on judicial decisionmaking behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. This is true not only with respect to legal issues inextricably intertwined with the Federalist Society, such as states' rights, but also, with issues long associated with the Republican Party writ large. We now consider why the Federalist Society may be influencing judicial decisionmaking.
There are two possible explanations as to why Federalist Society membership increases the likelihood of a conservative vote. One hypothesis is that the Society attracts its members from among those Republican lawyers and law students who already lie on the conservative end of the ideological continuum; this theory we term the "attraction" theory. Pursuant to the attraction theory, a variable controlling for Society membership may be conceived of as simply measuring a judge's political ideology. A second hypothesis is that the Society converts Republican lawyers who join its ranks to adopting the originalist method of constitutional interpreation. In other words, membership in the Society somehow socializes lawyers who may not ascribe to the originalist mode of constitutional interpretation when they join the organization -instead ascribing to the "living and evolving" constitutional paradigm --in such a manner that, over time, they are transformed into proponents of originalism; this theory is termed the "conversion" theory.
Unfortunately, given our data, it is impossible to reject the null hypotheses of either of these theories. At first glance, it may seem that we could rule out the attraction theory because our models control separately for Society membership and the judge's political ideology, and membership is still statistically significant. One could argue that if Society membership were measuring political ideology, then we would expect that this coefficient would not be statistically significant when political ideology is controlled for separately. However, it is just as plausible that the political ideology measure we use --and that is now the standard measure in studies of 18 Thus, in our models, it may be that the membership and ideology measures are both capturing political ideology.
Our data also presents limitations in making firm conclusions about the conversion theory. On the one hand, our finding that Society members are almost twice as likely than other Republican 18 As explained in Appendix A, these scores are derived from Poole-Rosenthal common space ideology scores, which are calculated specifically for presidents and members of Congress. A lower court judge is presumed to have the exact same ideology score as either his appointing president (when neither home state senator is from the same party as the president) or his home state senators (when at least one is from the president's party).
judges to render a conservative vote on a search and seizure motion seems to refute the notion that the Society is "converting" otherwise traditional Republicans to their way of thinking. This is due to the fact that such a "law and order" approach to criminal civil liberties cases has been a mainstay of Republican judicial selection since the Nixon administration thus pre-dating formation of the Society (Goldman 1997,198) . In short, Republican lawyers would not need the Federalist Society to introduce them to the idea that there is a competing approach to Fourth Amendment interpretation from that set down by Warren Court precedents. Thus, the fact that Federalist Society members are significantly more likely to adopt an originalist reading of the Fourth Amendment than non-member Republicans suggests that the Society is simply attracting the most conservative lawyers in the Republican Party -the same type of lawyers that Nixon was trying to identify in declaring a "law and order" litmus test for his judicial appointments.
But, in order to reject the null hypothesis (that the Society is not converting members), we would optimally need temporal data on judicial decisionmaking --i.e., decisions made before and after particular judges joined the Society. More conservative voting behavior by a judge after joining the organization would be compelling evidence that the Society converts members into more conservative jurists; the absence of change would suggest that conversion is not at work.
Such a study, however, is not possible using legal decisions given that Society-affiliated judges are chosen by Republican presidents specifically because they are already members of the organization and, as such, can be counted on to decide cases consistent with the president's conservative policy agenda. One possible study that may be able to overcome this hurdle -and, critically, a research design not reliant on legal decisions -would be to conduct interviews with law students who are members of the Federalist Society and explore, through qualitative methods, the reasons why they joined the organization and how membership may have impacted their views on constitutional interpretation. Second, this study demonstrates that there is now at work a new model for interest groups to follow in pursuit of their goal of influencing law and legal policy. Heretofore, studies of interest 19 We wish to thank one of our anonymous referees for suggesting this novel approach designed to tease out the attraction versus conversion theories. Republican presidents to appoint. Given how accurate and powerful a predictor Society membership is as to the likelihood that a potential nominee will have an extremely conservative voting record, it should be expected that future Republican presidents (at least those elected on a conservative platform) will increasingly turn to the ranks of the Federalist Society to nominate the majority of their federal court judges. We have already witnessed such a trend in the last two decades (see Table 1 ). Society membership, in essence, eliminates for a conservative Republican (Scherer 2005) and women judges more liberal than male judges (Boyd, Epstein and 
Conclusion
The results of this study confirm liberal interest groups' claims that Republican-appointed judges affiliated with the Federalist Society are more conservative in their decisionmaking behavior those who are not members of the Society. If the trend started by Bush (43) -making Society members the majority of appointments to the two highest levels of the federal judicial hierarchy -continues with future Republican presidents, the Federalist Society will arguably have scores are not adjusted when a senator or president is a white male, and the judge a female or African American.
gone a long way in realizing its goal, first articulated in the early 1980s, to change the way we, as Americans, interpret the Constitution. In short, there will be a sizable presence of Society members on the federal bench; these jurists, with life tenure, will have a long-lasting impact on how the U.S. Constitution is interpreted in our nation's courts; and that interpretation will be one of originalism, not the method which sees the Constitution as a living, evolving document. 
